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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Kentucky Transportation Research Program (KTRP) was requested to 
obtain and review design, construction, and post construction documents 
relative to the long-span structure under KY 80 in Floyd County. 
Telephone and in-person contacts were made with various agency officials 
involved with the structure in an endeavor to collect pertinent data. 
Documents that were initially presented to KTRP staff were thoroughly 
reviewed and a draft report based upon information submitted was 
prepared. The draft report included a scenario relating to a probable 
sequence of events that could have been significant in the ultimate 
collapse of the structure. 
Soon after distribution of the draft report and during the time of 
its review, additional information was forthcoming, and an Addendum was 
prepared and is included herein. Another probable cause of failure is 
included in the Addendum. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A 28'-1" (span) by 27'-10" (rise) by 267'-0" (bottom centerline 
length) corrugated metal Multi-Plate, Super-Span structure was designed, 
manufactured, and constructed to support the embankment and vehicles for 
KY 80, Hazard-Watergap Road, Station 1001+31.30 in Floyd County over the 
Chessie System, C&O spur line track 1222 at the valuation 9+53.02. The 
Chessie System designated that structure as Railway Bridge No. FH-4.7. 
The structure was assembled and the associated soil envelop was 
placed in April, May, and June 1980. Roadway surfacing for the project 
section including the long-span structure was completed August 4, 1981. 
November 1980 correspondence indicated the structure did not meet 
specified clearances for the railway track and the cross-sectional shape 
was outside the specified tolerances. Change Order No. 17 was issued in 
July 1981 and provided for installation of tension ties in a designated 
portion of the top of the super span. Relatively close surveillance was 
maintained thereafter. 
In April and May 1985, settlement was detected and wedging of the 
overlying pavement was necessary. Settlement monitoring was initiated 
in June 1985 and expert professional assistance was requested by 
Department of Highways, District 12 personnel. On March 5, 1986, a 
dimple was discovered in the top portion of the structure under the 
eastbound lanes. A 24-hour watch was implemented March 6 and efforts 
were undertaken to reduce dead load over the structure by removal of a 
portion of the embankment on the eastbound lanes side. 
Twenty-seven officials representing agencies involved in design, 
manufacture, assembly, and construction of the structure met March 13, 
1986, to develop remedial plans. Traffic was diverted from the 
eastbound lanes and one-lane, two-directional traffic was effected to 
the westbound lanes. Traffic control devices were located appropriately 
and around-the-clock flagging was in effect. Plans for repair were 
developed and later approved September 12, 1986. A letting date of 
November 14, 1986, was indicated on those plans. 
Sometime prior to about 2:15 am on October 26, 1986, a major portion 
of the super span under the westbound lanes collapsed. Soon thereafter 
two vehicles plunged into the chasm. Reportedly, the sole occupant of 
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each vehicle did not sustain major injuries. 
Kentucky Transportation Research Program (KTRP) was requested to 
collect relevant information and data, review design and construction 
documents, and determine the probable cause(s) of failure. 
AGENCIES INVOLVED 
Through a lease agreement with the Turnpike Authority of Kentucky, 
the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet, Department of Highways (KYDOH), was 
responsible for design and construction activities associated with the 
KY-80 relocation of the Hazard-Watergap Road. Brighton Engineering 
Company (BEC), by contract with KYDOH, acted as general consultants for 
engineering design and construction phases for the entire KY-80 project. 
Haworth & Associates, Inc. (HAl) was responsible for design and 
construction engineering supervision of Section 4 under the general 
supervision of BEC. HAl had the section more specifically designated 
12-705.0(04), KYRR 80-114, SP 36-61-21 between Stations 812+16 and 
1232+85. J. M. Crawford & Associates, Inc. (CAl) acted as 
subconsultants to HAl for structures on HAl's section. CAl coordinated 
design and construction engineering supervisor activities for all 
structures other than the long span structure. Fuller, Mossbarger, 
Scott & May (FMSM) acted as subconsultants to HAl and performed 
subsurface investigations, soils investigations and analyses, and 
presented design recommendations. 
Construction of Section 4003 between Stations 960+00 and 1036+00 was 
awarded to G&G Coal & Energy, Inc.; G&G Kentucky Construction Company, 
Inc.; and Elmo Greer (G&G) the composite of which is often referred to 
as Tri-Venture. Design, manufacture, erection and construction 
supervision of the long-span structure were performed by ARMCO, Inc. 
under a contract with G&G. Apparently Bowser-Morner, Inc. (BMI) acted 
as consultants to ARMCO, Inc. during placement of the earth envelop for 
the structure. The Chessie System owns and maintains the rail spur. 
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DESIGN FOR MULTI-PLATE, SUPER-SPAN 
Pertinent design information contained in documents submitted by 
officials of various agencies to KTRP principal investigators follows. 
J. M. Crawford transmitted an Advance Situation Folder for Bridge at 
Station 1001+31.30 to BEG and HAl by way of a document dated September 
3, 1976. M. F. Rudloff's, BEG, letter of October 21, 1976, to E. V. 
Hilton, KYDOH, noted the crossroad was not acceptable for the bridge 
under current policy. For that reason, BEG proposed the subject 
structure. 
J. w. Scott's, FMSM, January 26, 1977, letter to HAl contained 
information relative to a soils meeting attended by K. Jewell; W. A. 
Mossbarger, Jr.; and J. w. Scott. Item D of that letter stated: 
Station 1000+00 to 1010+00 (Refer to Note 14 of 
Brighton's letter of 11-22-76): With 12-inch vertical sand 
drains spaced on 16-foot centers, 90 percent of 
consolidation will occur in 200 days. Estimated cost is 
$130,000 to $175,000. The use of sand drains was not 
recommended. 
The fourth paragraph of M. F. Rudloff's February 14, 1977, letter to 
E. v. Hilton follows. 
The Soils Engineer recommended against the use of sand 
drains from Station 1000+00 to 1010+00 in Item D but does 
not make a positive recommendation for treatment of 
embankment areas where a settlement in the range of 22 
inches is anticipated in a 2 1/2 year period. For this 
reason we are requesting further comments from the Section 
Engineer. 
It appears a Maxi-Span Corrugated Metal Structure, manufactured by 
Republic Steel Corporation or Super-Span Corrugated Metal Structure, 
manufactured by Armco Steel Corporation, was then designated for use at 
Station 1001+31.30. The structure was to be designed in accordance with 
requirements of 1973 AASHTO specifications including interim 
specifications. The live load used was to be the HS 20-44 live load as 
specified in 1973 AASHTO specifications or an alternate loading of two 
24-kip axles spaced 4 feet apart, whichever produced the greater stress. 
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Design was to include the effect of forces due to settlement. The 
magnitudes of anticipated settlement, 90 percent of which was to occur 
during the first 30 days, were: 
Along centerline of Underpass - Approximately 2-1/2" at the 
centerline of proposed KY 80 and 
1-1/2" at the ends of Underpass. 
Along the outer edges of Underpass - Approximately 3-1/2" at 
centerline of proposed KY 80. 
Anticipated settlement data were included in a July 13, 1977, letter 
by J. W. Scott of FMSM to HAI. 





Chessie System officials, requirements of 
including interim specifications if any, 
1976 
were 
referenced on plan notes. Chessie System personnel requested use of an 
ARMCO super span. Chessie correspondence dated May 4, 1978, indicated 
reasons for preference of the super span were: 1) had experience with 
three super spans co.nstructed at various locations and 2) favored 
concrete thrust beams used by ARMCO rather than metal compaction wings 
used by Republic. A February 20, 1978, letter by M. F. Rudloff of BEG 
to E. V. Hilton (KYDOH) noted E-80 loading had been specified. 
J. w. Brent's (Chessie System) letter of May 26, 1978, to c. D. 
Powers (KYDOH) referenced the importance of proper bedding and backfill 
and noted that a small variation in the quality of bedding and backfill 
could cause the structure to collapse. The statement, "There have been 
instances where the structures have failed," was included in the second 
paragraph of that letter. Mr. Brent stated that 1 gage is justified and 
alluded to the possibility a lighter gage might be standard. 
J. w. Brent's November 16, 1978, letter to 1. w. Pike (KYDOH) noted 
the Chessie System review of Stage 1 Final Plans for the project. The 
fact that gage (thickness) for the multi-plate superspan was not shown 
on the drawing was noted. Mr. Brent noted the supers pan should be 1 
gage and it should be shown on the plans. He also stated that the final 
paragraph of the construction sequence indicated the Railroad would 
remove the existing rail and reconstruct the rail when required. 
Rewording was requested because it had been agreed the State's 
contractor would perform the work. 
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CAl's plans for the structure were dated as having been checked June 
1978 and were labeled Drawing No. 19782. Sheet 1 of 6 indicated a 
Multi-Plate Super-Span (1 Gage) Structure No. 81P24-66-75. Notes 
contained on Sheet 2 specified that the structure be designed in 
accordance with requirements of 1976 AASHTO specifications, including 
interim specifications, if any. The live load was to be HS 20-44 or an 
alternate loading of two 24-kip axles spaced 4 feet apart, whichever 
produced the greater stress. Design was also to include the effect of 
forces of settlement. Approximate settlement values were listed and 
corresponded to those listed in the July 13, 1977, FMSM letter. 
The plans designated erection to be in accordance with the 
manufacturer's drawings and recommendations. The design bearing 
pressure was not to exceed the recommended allowable of 1,600 psf. 
Distortion monitoring and control during backfilling were specified. 
Compaction methods or equipment producing unequal soil pressures or 
structure distortion were not to be permitted. 
The bedding designated was concrete sand or No. 11 crushed limestone 
at a minimum 6 inches thickness. Only material meeting the requirements 
of AASHTO M145 for Type A-1 or A-3 could be used in the envelope. Six-
inch loose layers compacted to not less than 95 percent of maximum 
density as determined by KM64-511 were designated. The contractor was 
to be responsible to remove the existing rail and to reconstruct the 
railroad when required. 
Sheet 3 contained a note requiring the initial roadway embankment to 
be constructed in advance of the construction of the underpass in order 
to minimize the differential settlement in the vicinity of the 
structure. The following were designated for live load: 
HS-20-44A- A.A.S.H.T.O. 
Cooper E80 - A.R.E.A. 
An envelope extending beyond the structure for a distance of 12'-0" on 
each side was shown on the typical section. Select backfill material 
meeting AASHTO A-1 classification was shown. 
A concrete thrust beam was shown on the section along the structure 
centerline. Also, the proposed roadway and elevations were shown. 
Sheet 4 contained subsurface exploration data. Distance from 
centerline hole surface elevation to refusal was shown as 47.0 feet 
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(649.9 - 602.9). Distance to refusal at 100.0 feet left of proposed KY 
80 and near the track centerline was 24.3 feet. At 110.0 feet right of 
proposed KY 80 centerline and near the track centerline, distance to 
refusal was 55.0 feet. 
Sheet 5 contained details for the inlet and outlet concrete collars. 
Sheet 6 provided information for the thrust beams. Detail A specified 
that reinforced concrete thrust beams be poured in such a manner as to 
maintain a balanced loading on each side of the structure. 
A letter dated January 8, 1980, from F. H. Miller of ARMCO to J. M. 
Crawford stated ARMCO had revised and was resubmitting SUPER-SPAN 
drawings. They had been asked to comment on the effect of settlement on 
the structure. It was noted the SUPER-SPAN is a flexible structure 
designed to deform rather than fail under moderate external load. 
Deformation up to 2 percent of its geometrical shape could be 
accommodated without structural harm. An office copy sketch dated 
10-17-79 of the cross section for the structure was attached to that 
letter. Also attached were drawings for movement control hooks, typical 
monitoring ideas, text relative to movement control, typical backfill 
plans for pear shape structure, backfill requirements, and super span 
structural check sheets. 
The first structural check sheet noted dimensions for the structure 
and indicated the maximum and minimum heights of cover as 10'-0" and 
2,5', respectively. Computations indicated backfill was assumed to be 
120 pounds per cubic foot and live load was negligible on the high side. 
Check computations were noted for No. 1 gage. Page 2 contained minimum 
slope collar details. The third page contained additional computations. 
Pages 1 and 3 contained: compute ring compression, compute wall stress, 
check wall stress, check seam strength, and check flexibility factor. 
The fourth and last page of the structural check contained 
computations relative to live loads from 1) HS 20-44 and 2) two 24-kip 
axles, 4'-0" apart at the guardrail where the height of fill proposed 
would be 2.3', The notation at the end of that sheet stated that in 
either case the high fill condition governs the design as PT = 1200. No 
evidence of consideration of the Cooper Ego AREA loading was discovered. 
A February 11, 1980, letter from E. Q. Johnson of the Chessie System 
to the attention of D. R. Houchin of ARMCO indicated railway personnel 
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had reviewed drawings, movement control procedure, and the plan view of 
the proposed structure. Drawings had been reviewed from a structural 
standpoint and Chessie personnel had no objection. He also noted that 
calculations showed greater clearances available than shown on Drawings 
103581 A and B. 
CONSTRUCTION 
The letting date for the section within which the structure was 
located was May 18, 1979. The project was awarded May 22, 1979, and the 
contract date was June 8, 1979. A Contractor's Pay Estimate form shows 
a Notice to Begin Work date of 07-13-1979 and lists the corrugated metal 
underpass as a lump sum item at a unit price of $600,000. G&G Coal & 
Energy Corp. Inc. & G&G KY Canst. Co Inc. & Elmo Greer, Vendor No. 
0577-6125 was noted as the contractor. 
B. L. Miller of ARMCO and Tom Caudill of G&G verified that erection 
of the super span was performed by the Construction Division of ARMCO 
and associated bedding and backfill was placed by G&G. Records indicate 
BMI personnel moni tared erection activities and obtained samples and 
tested bedding and backfill materials. 
Daily Inspector's Reports for the period March 26, 1980, through 
June 20, 1980, were provided to KTRP investigators for cursory review. 
The majority of those reports indicated James H. Singleton as the 
inspector completing the forms and James E. Tramel as the Project 
Engineer representing HAI. Dates for staking, track removal, footer 
placement, cradle excavation, placement of bedding sand, super span 
erection, 8-inch pipe placement, track reconstruction, backfilling, and 
placement of materials for the thrust beams were noted. 
The Daily Inspector's Reports did not reveal major problems with 
erection and construction associated with the super-span structure. The 
report dated 5-29-1980 noted: "BK. Fill on super span was stopped -
Material unfit." The report dated 5-30-1980 noted: "BK. Filling super 
span. 
A May 7, 1980, structural inspection report by BEC, CAI, and HAI 
personnel indicated concern about horizontal alignment of each plate. 
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It was stated that "The Contractor, ARMCO, assured us the multi plate 
would align itself after the ring was closed and he would make necessary 
adjustments then." July 1980 letters indicated concern about the 
proposed height of cover at the west edge of the pavement. ARMCO 
personnel apparently thought it was to be about 1. 5 feet. J. M. 
Crawford talked (phone) to F. H. Miller of ARMCO on July 24, 1980, and 
Mr. Miller forwarded a letter to Mr. Crawford on that date stating the 
fill height at the pavement edge= 3.5', at the guardrail= 2.5', and at 
edge of shoulder= 2.3'. Mr. Miller urged that, during the construction 
period, a temporary cushion be maintained to insure that heavy 
construction loads do not damage the structure. 
A November 25, 1980, letter by J. E. Tramel, HAI, to L. Anderson, 
G&G, stated that measurements by HAl indicated the structure (super 
span) did not meet specified clearances, relative to the C&O Railway 
track. Surveys and drawings were made November 6, 1980 showing 
deformation of the structure and profiling the structure settlement. 
Maximum settlement was in the order of six inches. It also noted the 
cross-sectional shape of the structure to be outside specified 
tolerances. G&G was requested to advise HAI of G&G's proposed remedial 
program. 
F. Samani, BEC, corresponded with F. H. Miller by a letter dated 
November 26, 1980. Mr. Samani stated that Mr. Miller had indicated that 
a 2 percent change in shape of the structure should be a cause for 
concern. Samani noted that a preliminary investigation of the present 
cross section at the mid-length of the structure based on the data 
furnished by the Section Engineer revealed that the structure had gone 
through deformations equaling approximately 4. 5 percent of its overall 
design depth. Results of ARMCO's survey, structural analysis of its 
present shape, and limits of acceptable deformation were requested. 
F. Samani's December 5, 1980, Memorandum to File documented that F. 
H. Miller had collected survey data. Data were to be studied and 
results of findings and recommendations (from ARMCO) were expected the 
following week. 
F. H. Miller documented survey data in his December 12, 1980, letter 
to F. Samani. The following were noted: 
1. The structure has settled in a relatively smooth 
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curve from essentially 0' at the ends to 1.4' at or near the 
centerline of KY 80. 
2. This "bending of the structure's back" has caused an 
increase in the top radius, an increase in the bottom 
radius, and has led to a decrease in total rise of 
approximately 4.4% (exact measurements were impossible 
because of presence of track and ballast). 
3. Maximum span measurements have not increased 
proportionately (28'-1" per plan and a maximum of 28'-4" 
recorded), so the sides of the structure and the thrust 
beams are still "locked in", 
The cause of the settlements was attributed to the foundation on which 
the structure and surrounding backfill were placed. Settlements that 
had already taken place were stated as being about five times the 
magnitude of predicted settlements. The observed shape of the cross 
section coupled with ARMCO calculations indicated the structure was 
sound and still had an adequate, although diminished, safety factor. 
Mr. Miller pointed out they could not be certain as to the 
structure's ability to withstand further settlement. The fact that 
slight movements had taken place between readings on November 13 and 
December 2 indicated it was possible further settlement would take 
place. It was not within the realm of their expertise to determine the 
probability or magnitude of future settlements, according to Mr. Miller. 
He said it would be prudent for Brighton to undertake an immediate and 
thorough investigation of the foundations of both the structure and its 
soil envelop to determine if the settlement had ceased and/or if 
stabilization were required. 
J. w. Scott's, FMSM, February 10, 1981, letter to F. Meyer, HAI, 
stated they had been asked to make an inspection of the Super Span on KY 
80 and to determine if the foundation soils beneath the structure were 
likely to undergo settlement in the future. The following information 
was presented in Mr. Scott's letter. 
On December 23, 1980, we met with Jim Tramel at the site 
and reviewed the construction history of the Super Span. 
Inasmuch as we were interested in monitoring any possible 
foundation settlement, we selected the eyebolts protruding 
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from the structural plates along both sides of the structure 
and lying below the railroad grade as being the lowest 
readily accessible point to monitor. We uncovered most of 
these eyebolts and determined the elevation of each on this 
date. 
On January 23, 1981, the elevations of the eyebolts were 
checked and no detectable difference from the December 23 
elevations was found. Additionally, Mr. Tramel sent us 
elevations of these points that he took on November 11, 
December 29, January 16 and February 2 and a review of this 
information indicates no settlement taking place. 
It is our conclusion that the foundation soils beneath 
the Super Span are presently undergoing no detectable 
settlement and that there should be no significant 
settlement of the foundation soils in the future. 
The following two paragraphs were taken from J. E. Tramel's, HAI, 
letter of February 19, 1981, toR. J. Noon, BEC. 
We understand the manufacturer is currently analyzing 
the structure as it exists relative to structural adequacy. 
Should the manufacturer certify to us that the structure in 
its present shape has an acceptable factor of safety and the 
contractor provide us with correspondence from the Railroad 
agreeing to accept the clearances as they exist and that the 
Railroad withhold KYDOH harmless from any clearance problems 
they may have with the structure as it exists, then we 
recommend that the structure be accepted subject to penalty. 
Should these conditions not be achievable, we would 
recommend expeditious undertaking of a construction program 
designed to eliminate the current problems with the 
structuree This will be necessary to eliminate or minimize 
delay to the projected paving operations on the project. 
An April 1, 1981, letter from R. Greer, G&G, to J. E. Tramel stated 
it was evident dimensional errors were due to foundation settlement 
rather than deflection of the structure. He said the structure was 
constructed in strict compliance with specifications in all phases. Mr. 
Greer pointed out that G&G were not required to conduct a subsurface 
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investigation nor were they responsible for subsurface conditions or 
reactions. G&G planned to finish the project within the specified time 
and needed to begin constructing the super-span headwalls immediately. 
A response 
desired. 
in writing was requested in the event headwalls were not 
Specific instructions of what was to be done were also 
requested if headwalls were not to be constructed. 
The contents of J. E. Tramel's April 7, 1981, letter to R. Greer 
follows. 
Your letter of April 1, concerning subject, requested 
specific instructions concerning the Super Span. Mr. Lee 
Anderson of your office received a copy of our latest 
correspondence to Mr. Noon dated February 19, 1981, copy 
attached. We have not received a response to that letter. 
We also did not receive a response to our letter of November 
25, 1980, to Mr. Anderson of your office advising him of 
deficiencies in the structure as it exists and requesting 
advice relative to your proposed remedial program. 
We understand the vendor will be in contact with the 
railroad relative to their acceptance of the structure as it 
exists. We cannot accept the structure until the clearance 
problem has been resolved. Any work performed in the 
immediate area of the Super Span would be at your risk and 
predicated on your conception of the probability of eventual 
acceptance of the structure as it exists. Hopefully the 
matter may be resolved in the immediate future. 
F. H. Miller provided information to R. Kendall, Chessie System, in 
a May 15, 1981, letter. Therein, settlement and track shimming were 
identified as having trimmed several inches from the top corners of the 
original rectangular clearance diagram. FMSM's letter and movement 
control hook reading information were referenced for determining that 
settlement had ceased. A ring compression safety factor greater than 
2.0 was cited. R. E. Weiford was quoted as "There's strength in 
flexibility." An early review of material was requested along with a 
response to the acceptability of the structure to the Chessie System. 
Mr. Miller's May 15, 1981, letter to F. Samani stated it would be 
prudent to install some tension ties in the top of the structure. The 
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ties were to provide some added reinforcing of the top arc in the area 
of the longest radius about 16 feet long - 8 feet either side of Station 
50+12. Suggested details were attached. 
Contents of E. Q. Johnson's, Chessie System, letter of June 9, 1981, 
to F. H. Miller follow. 
This has reference to your letter of May 15, 1981, 
relative to the above structure constructed by the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky to carry side track 1222 under 
Route 80 relocated in Floyd County. 
We will accept the structure as it now stands with 
22'-0" vertical clearance for a width of six feet each side 
of centerline of track. Existing clearance in each of the 
upper quadrants has been reduced below the design clearance 
of 22'-0" for the width from six to eight feet beyond 
centerline. This acceptance of the clearance is based on 
your assurance that settlement of the structure has ceased. 
In addition, we recommend that the strut shown on your 
drawing 103674 be installed. 
An Advance Approval for Change Order for a change order was 
initiated by B. L. Wheat, KYDOH, on June 26, 1981. The request was for 
$6,000.00 for 18 struts to be placed in the superspan at Sta. 1001+31. 
Change Order No. 17 indicated Struts for the Superspan lump sum for 
$6,000.00. First and last signature dates on that Change Order were 
7/11 1981 (Rex Greer) and 7/31 1981 (Dean Huff, KYDOH), respectively. 
The effective date of formal acceptance for the contract section 
within which the super span was located was November 5, 1981. 
POST CONSTRUCTION EVENTS 
The complete project was inspected, including structures, and was 
accepted November 5, 1981. An initial structural inventory and 
Appraisal Report was completed for the super span on June 16, 1983. 
Condition ratings for Item 62, Culverts and Retaining Walls, and Item 
65, Alignment, were good and no defects were noted. The next scheduled 
inspection was to be in June 1985. That schedule is in conformance with 
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normal practices. 
A June 6, 1985, memorandum from F. Goble to A. B. Blankenship and 
attention w. A. Crace related recent experience of a settlement 
condition over the tunnel for C&O Railroad access to the Bucks Branch 
area. The existing dip across all four lanes, median and shoulder was 
12 to 14 inches and would be leveled by Floyd County Maintenance forces. 
Mr. Goble said recent meetings with construction and maintenance 
personnel from the Central office and Pikeville were held to study the 
course of action needed to be taken. 
That memorandum noted that a meeting with ARMCO engineers on the 
problem was pending. He said their office had set up a weekly 
monitoring system by the bridge inspectors for comparison with the 
original shop drawings. It was recommended they take into consideration 
Transportation plans that utilize coal haul over the large structure. 
Mr. Goble said the plans should be limited to weights posted by 
Blankenship's office. 
F. Goble's June 7, 1985, memorandum to files referenced a meeting on 
that date in D. Biliter's office. Mr. Biliter asked H. Reed to contact 
ARMCO and set an appointment with an engineering expert on the 
construction of the structure. H. Reed called T. Wederman (ARMCO) who 
said their engineers had been monitoring settlement and seemed to think 
the whole fill, railroad and all, were settling; not just the pipe. 
Mr. Goble's June 24, 1985, memorandum to file made record of a 
meeting in Mr. !son's (KYDOH) office attended by referenced District 12 
personnel. F. Goble said he contacted Mr. Wederman and ARMCO personnel 
had measured the structure last October 1984. Mr. Biliter said District 
12 needed to start their own monitoring procedures now. L. Hampton and 
T. Frazier were to start that day (June 24, 1985). They were to monitor 
and record in bridge files every two weeks on Mondays. A meeting with 
ARMCO was scheduled July 8, 1985. A page following the June 24 
memorandum showed sketches of the Martin end, 
end. Vertical dimensions from top of rail 
22'-10", 22'-7"", and 22'-6" for the three 
center, and Bucks Branch 
to top of conduit were 
locations cited in the 
previous sentence, respectively. Two horizontal dimensions for each 
location, respectively, totaled 18"-4", 17"-9", and 17"-2". 
D. A. Ream's, BMI, September 19, 1985, letter to F. Goble said top 
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cord and rise measurements Goble made were being forwarded to J, Noll, 
ARMCO, for his evaluation. Mr. Ream stated that the rise measurements 
had not been tied into the bench mark and they, BMI, therefore were 
unable to determine if any settlement had occurred since the last rise 
measurements made in 1980. He cited the reason for not using the rails 
as a reference -- tracks would also settle if structure as a whole was 
settling. He said the manhole at the east end of the structure had been 
used as a bench mark and the paint marks were still visible in August 
(1985). 
F. Goble submitted to D. A. Ream additional field measurements with 
a letter of October 7, 1985. Mr. Goble requested a professional opinion 
on the problem as soon as possible. In an October 10, 1985, letter from 
F. Goble to D. A. Ream, Mr. Goble stated he had noticed more settlement 
over the structure when traveling east on KY 80 on October 9, 1985. He 
said heavy trucks were causing severe impact once again. 
An October 10, 1985, memorandum from H. F. Reed, by F. Goble, to G. 
Asbury, attention H. Evans or R. Sutherland cited a meeting with ARMCO 
for expert assistance on steps that should be taken and to determine 
cause for the settlement. Field measurements had been furnished by 
Bridge Inspectors to D. Ream and C. Bishop of BMI and their (BMI) report 
was pending review of those field measurements. A request for 
assistance in determining procedures that should be taken to correct the 
settlement condition was included in the memorandum. It was recommended 
that a contract be awarded rather than using state forces to make the 
corrections once they were determined. 
D. A. Ream's October 15, 1985, letter to F. Goble noted Goble's 
October 2, 1985, elevations had been compared to measurements made 
February 23, 1981. Measurements showed the span had settled at all 
locations and was most severe at points C, D, J, K, and L. The cause of 
settlement was noted as undetermined. Measurements were forwarded to J. 
Noll, ARMCO, for his evaluation. 
Goble's October 10, 1985, letter 
Mr. Ream referenced receipt of F. 
noting observation of additional 
settlement. It was their, BMI, strong recommendation that you (Goble) 
DO NOT PLACE additional asphalt on the structure until the structural 
integrity of the span could be evaluated and the cause of settlement 
determined. Mr. Ream said BMI could provide a complete evaluation 
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service and would provide a proposal for the work upon request. 
An October 25, 1985, letter by F. Goble, from H. F. Reed to G. 
Asbury, attention R. Sutherland transmitted the BMI October 15, 1985, 
letter. It was noted that a dip condition over the structure was due to 
settlement and the traffic crew had installed a warning sign. A request 
for assistance on possible corrective measures was included in Mr. 
Goble's letter. He said the District's expertise on a project of that 
nature was limited. Mr. Goble cited the need for a special task force 
to complete the investigation and recommended that contract services be 
issued to BMI for the proposed project. He also recommended that the 
project be let to contract for repairs. He requested a decision on that 
very important matter as soon as possible. Field information supplied 
by L. Hampton was attached. 
In response to F. Goble's October 25, 1985, memorandum, R. K. 
Sutherland's November 5, 1985, memo to K. Ison, Jr., attention F. Goble, 
requested additional information not included in the October 25 
memorandum. Mr. Sutherland stated that any wedging or patching 
necessary on the roadway should be done as soon as possible. He was of 
the opinion that increased impact loading due to the dip would be more 
harmful than some additional dead load. 
D. Ream forwarded control hook elevations made during construction 
to F. Goble by way of form PK111R-2 dated December 5, 1985. 
A January 7, 1986, memorandum toR. K. Sutherland, from K. !son, Jr. 
and by F. Goble transmitted requested additional information. Under 
Item 4 of that memorandum, it was noted that visual inspection of the 
inside walls of the structure reflected no serious distortion problem. 
Under Item 5, it was stated that any wedging or patching necessary had 
not been accomplished due to work schedules and availability of hot mix. 
Dip signs had been installed. 
Field book notations and Bridge Inspection Reports for the period of 
October 2, 1985, through October 2, 1986, were supplied to KTRP 
personnel for review. Elevations through the structure were referenced 
to a bench mark on a water main lid on October 2 and again on December 
16, 1985. On December 16, it was noted no additional deformation was 
visible in the top of the structure. The next field book page supplied 
was dated March 6, 1986. 
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On March 5, 1986, F. H. Miller of ARMCO stopped by the structure 
about 4:00pm and what he saw was not good. Mr. Miller called F. Goble 
at 5:35 pm to report his observations. Mr. Goble documented events 
thereafter extensively and most thoroughly. The following is a synopsis 
of significant events extracted from Mr. Goble's penciled notes for the 
period 5:35 pm March 5, 1986, through 4:15 pm March 26, 1986. 
F. H. Miller told Mr. Goble that a condition such as he had observed 
March 5 was very serious and that such conditions had led to snap 
failures in the past. F. Goble called L. Hampton to see when Hampton 
had last looked at the structure. Hampton said about three weeks ago 
and it looked OK inside the arch, and inspection notes reflect this. 
Goble called J. Wright for possible traffic control, and he called D. 
Biliter to see if he should call Frankfort. Biliter said yes. Various 
calls were made until 10:20 pm. Mr. Goble met others at the structure 
at 11:30 pm and trucks with flashing lights, barrels, sign posts, and 
flashing bar lights were put in place. 
On March 6, G. Asbury was informed of the situation and he was to 
have someone there about noon. Miller and Goble met at the site at 8:30 
am and decided to partially unload a portion of the structure. 
Appropriate contacts were made to start that operation. It was decided 
to make KY 80 one lane eastbound. Measurements were obtained on the 
inside walls (D. Ream, BMI). They continued removing earth and making 
measurements until 6:00 pm. 
A boom truck was obtained March 7 for use in obtaining measurements. 
K. Ison, Jr. arrived at site at 2:00 pm and a Channel 57 (Hazard TV) 
crew arrived at 2:30 pm. D. Ream called at 4:50 pm and said they had 
the computer analysis of measurements and reported it as very critical 
and could possibly fail. Removal of a lot of load over the structure 
should make it OK; however, Ream advised to continue monitoring. Goble 
immediately called Roberts to establish 24-hour watch. He radioed for 
necessary items to be ready to close KY 80 quickly. Mr. Goble conferred 
with ARMCO personnel and discussed the idea of materials exploration. 
Yes good idea was the response. 
On March 9, L. Roberts reported he had noticed that some wires that 
had been placed for measurements had broken. There were also some more 
cracks in the concrete parapet wall. Cracks in the parapet and road 
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were painted and marked and men were asked to keep an eye on them and 
call Goble if they noticed any change. F. H. Miller called and 
requested measurements soon. 
March 10 discussions involved reducing the weight limit and posting 
as soon as possible. A meeting was held to discuss alternatives. C&O 
was asked to remove rail cars and inside measurements were obtained. 
Milling operations were begun on March 11. Measurements were 
relayed to D. Ream and the BMI computer analysis revealed Station 0+60 
as 50 percent distorted and worse than at Station 0+48. Station 0+60 
was noted as being under the eastbound lanes. A noted entry for that 
date was "CLOSE 2E bound lanes KY 80. Measurements showed sides of 
structure were OK." 
On March 12, there were more milling operations. D. Ream was 
contacted and he said movement was not critical enough to close KY 80. 
It was decided to remove the concrete parapet wall and footer to remove 
more weight. They were removed and hauled away. 
A meeting was held March 13 and was attended by 27 people. 
Recommendations were: 1) close two eastbound lanes of KY 80, 2) unload 
more, 3) get soils survey, 4) install temporary rings, 5) make pavement 
repairs, and 6) get more measurements. The question of safety of 
personnel within the structure was raised. Some felt uneasy being 
inside. It was noted that the same type arch collapsed last year in 
Ohio and killed five to seven persons. The 24-hour watch was to be 
continued until more work was done. 
More measurements were obtained March 14 and relayed to D. Ream. 
Ream conferred with D. Cowherd and they thought it should be OK. 
Goble contacted J. Plummer on March 19 relative to closing the two 
eastbound lanes, and Plummer said the crash cushions had not arrived 
yet. 
R. Sutherland contacted K. Ison, Jr. on March 20 and requested that 
earth be removed over the outlet end, shoulders and part of the 
eastbound lanes. Goble and Biliter arrived at the site at 11:50 am and 
soil was being removed. 
J. Wright helped take measurements on March 21 to determine exactly 
where the tension ties were located. By 4:30 pm, most of the fill had 
been removed from pipe back about 60 feet and conditions were the same 
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as before inside the structure. 
More fill was removed March 22. Inside was checked again, and it 
was noticed that a large sag had appeared in the under side of the top 
72 feet back from the Martin end. This was caused by dropping a large 
section of asphalt when removing fill material. All work was stopped at 
10:30 am. Contact was made with F. H. Miller and he agreed work should 
be stopped. He said the situation was very serious and two men should 
check for change every 30 minutes be ready to close KY 80 quickly. 
Numerous calls were noted relative to the situation. At 8:45 pm, F. H. 
Miller called to say he would be flying in at 9:00am on March 23. 
On Sunday, March 23, a meeting was held at the site. It was noted 
that huge chunks of pavement broken off and dropped by the Bantam had 
caused a dimple or bulge in the structure. F. H. Miller recommended 
placing a jacking post under bulge -- Denton said not yet. They decided 
to try something different. Drill holes on 2-foot centers and then lift 
pavement from top with Bantam. 
The Floyd County Crew was drilling holes at 7:00am on March 24. At 
9:30 am, 
bulge was 
the pavement was still coming up in big chunks. Structure 
still same as before at 11:45 am. The Materials people and 
drill rig from Frankfort arrived at 1:31 pm. At 4:05 pm, Mr. Biliter 
stated he wanted photos showing sub grade material and backfill with 
sandstone. 
On March 25, a check was made to see if they could rent a Cat-235 
Trac Hoe on an emergency basis. At 9:15 am, Goble checked the bulge 
(due to dropping asphalt) in the structure -- no change. It was decided 
to pull pavement from top, peel back, and then load out. It was finally 
agreed to pull out KYDOH staff and get something in that could do the 
job quickly. Approval was received from P. Wolf at 4:20 pm. 
The structure was checked on March 26 and photos of subgrade 
materials and fill around the structure were obtained. A Case 580D 
backhoe with ram arrived at 9:00 am. A 4:15 pm entry noted a night 
watchman should remain at the site until further notice. 
This ends the synopsis extracted from Mr. Goble's notes, and 
information gained from other documents follows. 
G. w. Asbury's March 17, 1986, memo to A. R. Romine contained 
information relative to the March 13 meeting as supplied by R. K. 
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Sutherland and J. D. Wood. A rough estimate for repair was $300,000. 
Mr. Asbury recommended that his office be allowed to negotiate a 
contract to construct a temporary HS-20 structure at the site in case 
deformation continued under the westbound lanes. He also noted that a 
slab was being designed to be placed on beams that were on the bridge 
yard. That plan would allow them to react immediately to an emergency 
situation. G. W. Asbury listed the following things the Department was 
doing. 
1. Traffic is being removed from both eastbound lanes 
to the westbound side. The fill will be excavated on the 
eastbound side. The possibility exists that the westbound 
side could also fail. In this event, we would need to 
provide a temporary bridge to maintain a normal flow of 
traffic. This could cost as much as $175,000. 
2. The Division of Materials. is conducting tests to 
determine the content of the existing fill. Also, a 
recommendation will be made as to stabilizing existing 
material. 
3. The Division of Bridges is estimating various 
alternatives to a ring beam retrofit. The cost of these 
alternatives will be weighed against ARMCO's estimate for 
ring beam retrofit combined with fill stabilization costs. 
A TD 10-1 for $500,000 will be submitted under a 
separate cover. Account 210 will be shown on the TD 10-1. 
Bennie Wheat advises that there may be original construction 
funds still available. 
Please advise as quickly as possible. 
By way of a March 19, 1986, memo, G. W. Asbury transmitted a Project 
Authorization to be executed to A. R. Romine. It was noted that funds 
were available in the KY 80 Project Account 850. It was recommended 
that engineers in the Department determine a cure for the problems of 
the structure independent of ARMCO or others. 
Mr. Miller forwarded drawings showing possible repair details to K. 
Ison, Jr. by way of a March 27, 1986, letter. H. F. Miller stated 
repairs would simply reshape and stiffen the top arc and the long-term 
solution to the problem must involve a complete soils study and the 
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appropriate remedial measures. 
G. W. Asbury's March 28, 1986, memo to R. K. Capito forwarded copies 
of letters sent out in an attempt to secure proposals for emergency 
procedures. Mr. Asbury stated the three contractors represented the 
best potential based on KYDOH experience and a cursory review of their 
current situation relative to rapid mobilization and completion. The 
letters were dated March 17, 1986, and referenced an April 3, 1986, 
meeting at the site for interested personnel. Mr. Asbury's memo of 
April 10, 1986, to A. R. Romine noted receipt of two bids -- one for 
$85,350 and one for $82,400. Insurance and Type A end treatment deducts 
were cited. 
An April 16, 1986, memo from H. Mathis, by D. Smith, to K. Ison, Jr. 
noted that the requested subsurface investigation had been completed. 
Nine of ten samples tested from the embankment classified as A-4 by the 
AASHTO system. The majority of samples indicated the embankment was 
constructed of shale. A bag sample of the existing subgrade had a CBR 
of 7.3. The material classified as A-4(0) with approximately 50 percent 
silt and clay. It was their understanding the project was designed for 
sandstone subgrade. 
G. W. Asbury's April 30, 1986, memo to A. R. Romine forwarded copies 
of a proposed contract for a temporary bridge in the event the existing 
structure continued to deteriorate. It was noted as being generally 
agreed that processing would proceed to the point of obtaining the 
Secretary's signature, and that would occur only if it was determined 
the temporary bridge was needed to maintain the flow of traffic on KY 
80. 
R. K. Sutherland's May 18, 1986, letter to F. H. Miller forwarded a 
preliminary drawing for retrofit of the KY 80 superspan for Mr. Miller's 
review and commentse 
In June 1986, R. Sutherland forwarded potential remedial plans to F. 
H. Miller for review. Mr. Miller phoned Mr. Sutherland and stated that 
plans appeared suitable providing soils had stabilized and no more 
settlements were anticipated. On August 8, 1986, minor plan revisions 
were made and were forwarded to District 12 personnel for review. On 
August 19, 1986, Division of Maintenance transmitted the plans to the 
Division of Bridges. The Traffic Control and Construction Phasing plans 
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were to be effected. 
Plans for repairs were developed and approved by G. W. Asbury 
9-12-1986. A letting date of 11-14-86 was indicated. KTRP personnel 
photographed the structure on October 21, 1986 and signs of eminent 
failure were not evident. 
At approximately 2:00 am EST on October 26, 1986, the structure 
collapsed. Contents of Mr. Goble's October 28, 1986, memorandum to K. 
Ison, Jr. follows. 
On Sunday, October 26, 1986, at approximately 2:00 am, 
Eastern Standard Time, the large super span arch pipe 
carrying a C & 0 Railroad spur under four-lane KY 80 at 
Martin collapsed. 
At 2:40 am, Mr. Denton Biliter called the writer at home 
and informed him of the condition. He mentioned that two 
cars had already fallen into the large cavity due to the 
collapsed pipe. Arrangements had already been made to 
remove the vehicles. 
At 3:15 am, I arrived at the site. The cars were being 
removed at this time. I checked all traffic control devices 
and they were still intact, except the signs or barrels that 
had fallen into the cave-in. The flashing arrows on the 
west end of the channelization were still flashing. Mr. 
Biliter and Leo Roberts, County Foreman, had contacted Mr. 
Jim Wright for quick placement of a detour around the 
closure. Flagmen were at both ends of the project stopping 
traffic. I also learned that Mr. Dennis Huff of Crew 036 
had been on duty that night and assisted the people in the 
accident. He got hold of the proper authorities as soon as 
possible and continued to flag other traffic before they, 
too, had an accident. 
At 4:45 am, I called Mr. Richard Sutherland at Frankfort 
to inform him of this condition. 
As soon as it became daylight, photographs (both 
polaroid and 35 mm) were taken of the pipe failure. 
The detour was being marked by the traffic crews and KY 
80 was barricaded at both ends of the project. Flagmen was 
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placed at each end of the job. 
ANALYSES 
AASHTO design standards that were current and available to designers 
during the period of design of the super-span structure were: 
1. Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges, Twelfth Edition, 
1977: 
2. Interim Specifications- Bridges, 1978; and 
3. Interim Specifications - Bridges, 1979. 
Section 9 of the twelfth edition, 1977, is titled: Soil-Metal Plate 
Structural Interaction Systems - Corrugated Metal and Structural Plate 
Pipes and Pipe-Arches. Article 1.9.10 is titled: Long Span Structural 
Plate Structures. Modifications for Section 9 were included in the 1978 
Interim Specifications. No revisions to Section 9 were included in the 
1979 Interim Specifications. 
Cross-sectional requirements of the structure under design are 
established. For the structure under KY 80, internal height and width 
requirements were primarily governed by dimensions necessary to 
accommodate the rails, ties, ballast, engine(s), and cars (hoppers, 
etc.). Total lengths (top and bottom) for the structure would be 
dependent upon height of fill to be placed above the structure; 
embankment slopes; longitudinal grade to which the structure would be 
constructed; widths of roadway(s), median, and shoulder(s); and possibly 
other considerations. 
Structural design may commence once cross-section dimensional 
requirements have been established and soil parameters are known. 
Realistic, probable expected values for soil parameters are vital 
because the design criteria consider the mutual function of the metal 
ring and the soil envelope surrounding it. Interaction of those two 
materials produces a composite structure. Expected live loads and dead 
loads to be supported are selected. Design computations are then made 
for a hypothetical structure one foot in length. The structure is not 
designed to act as a longitudinal beam. Sectional requirements for an 
entire structure could theoretically vary throughout its length if each 
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one-foot segment were to be considered. Some structures have been 
designed sectionally -- one section for the high fill portion of the 
embankment and one or more sections under each embankment slope. 
Design steps include computations for thrust in the pipe wall, 
buckling stress, handling and installation strength, seam strength, and 
deflection or flattening. Values required may be determined and 
required wall thickness and configuration (pitch, depth, and inside 
forming radius) may be ascertained. A minimum factor of safety of 2.0 
is common. The selected structure is checked and essentially design is 
complete. 
The AASHTO specifications contain recommendations for vehicular live 
loads and soil parameters for consideration. AASHTO design 
specifications do not contain any reference to considerations of railway 
loadings within a corrugated metal structure. The AASHTO specifications 
do not present structural design considerations for situations of 
differential settlement throughout the length of the structure wherein 
it might be necessary to explore the longitudinal beam concept. 
Section 23 of the twelfth edition, 1977, is titled: Construction 
and Installation of Soil Metal Plate Structure Interaction Systems. The 
1978 interim contains additions or revisions to Section 23. The 1979 
interim did not contain additions or revisions to Section 23. The 
section presents relevant information pertaining to good construction 
practices essential to obtaining the soil-metal plate structure 
interaction. The contents of Article 2.23.8 - Camber follow. 
The invert grade of the pipe shall be cambered, when 
required, by an amount sufficient to prevent the development 
of a sag or back slope in the flow line as the foundation 
under the pipe settles under the weight of embankment. The 
amount of camber shall be based on consideration of the 
flow-line gradient, height of fill, compressive 
characteristics of the supporting soil, and depth of 
supporting soil stratum to rock. 
When specified on the plans, long-span structures shall 
be vertically elongated approximately 2 percent during 
installation to provide for compression of the backfill 
under higher fills. 
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Information contained in documents presented for review indicates 
AASHTO design and construction requirements were met or exceeded for the 
KY 80 structure, except for the consideration of camber. Anticipated 
settlements, 90 percent of which were expected to occur the first 30 
days, were 2 1/2, 1 1/2, and 3 1/2 inches at locations noted under the 
design section of this report. The absence of camber to accommodate 
anticipated settlements of those magnitudes for a structure 267'-0" in 
length is not considered as a significant factor leading to ultimate 
collapse. 
A-1 and/or A-3 class soils were designated for use in the soil 
envelope for the structure. Construction records indicate specification 
requirements were met. Specimens obtained from the soil envelope after 
construction indicated much of that material classified as A-4. In 
accordance with requirements of AASHTO M 145, soils and soil-aggregate 
mixtures are classified based on laboratory determination of particle-
size distribution, liquid limit, and plasticity index. A requirement 
for the envelope was that it be compacted in 6-inch loose layers to not 
less than 95 percent of maximum density as determined by KM 64-511. 
Materials initially classifying as either A-1 or A-3 may later, after 
compaction, classify as A-4. 
Because of reported large settlements in the foundation, a finite 
element analysis was performed in an attempt to determine the magnitude 
and combination of loads that may have been necessary to produce such 
reported movements. It must be noted that little soils information was 
available and many parameters had to be assumed. The support provided 
to the structure by the soil envelope was applied as a concentrated load 
at each nodal point around the structure. The magnitudes of these loads 
were assumed from a typical distribution published in Chapter 23 
(entitled "Buried Structures," by R. K. Watkins) of the Foundation 
Engineering Handbook by Winterhorn. The foundation was assumed to have 
a CBR of 7.0. The modulus of the foundation soil was assumed to be 
7,500 psi and it was assumed to have a Poisson's ratio of 0 .40. The 
steel of the super span was given an assumed modulus of 30,000,000 psi 
and a Poisson's ratio of 0.30. An assumed 1-foot section was analyzed 
under the 10-foot portion of the embankment. 
analyzed. 
Two load cases were 
PAGE 25 
1. The weight of the fill above and around the culvert and the 
weight of the culvert itself were the only loads considered on the 
foundation. The influence of the settlement of the foundation and fill 
adjacent to the culvert (soil arching) was not considered. 
2. The weight of the fill above and around the culvert, the weight 
of the culvert, the weight of an 82 ,000-pound tridem (the authors are 
aware that the tridem is a dynamic load, however, for the purposes of a 
cursory analysis, it was assumed to be static), the weight of a loaded 
gondola car on the tracks, and any additional dead load that may have 
been caused by differential settlement between exterior soil prisms and 
the interior soil prism were considered. 
In the first load case, the largest calculated settlement in the 
foundation was 1.6 inches. The largest deflection in the top of the 
culvert was calculated to be 2.6 inches. However for Load Case 2, the 
largest calculated settlement in the foundation was 18 inches. The 
calculated deflection at the top of the barrel was 40 inches. 
As previously stated, all of the original soils and subsurface data 
were not available to the investigators. However, settlement 
calculations and some void ratio versus pressure curves were available. 
The original soil stress values were calculated using the computer 
program ICES-SEPOL written at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Although all of the soils data were not available, it was possible to 
approximate the soil stresses calculated in the original settlement 
analysis, using the same computer program (ICES-SEPOL). A check of the 
original settlement calculations using the stresses from ICES-SEPOL 
indicated proper procedures were followed. Although the original 
settlement calculations apparently (as best as could be determined) did 
not include train loads, the resulting difference in settlement would 
have been less than two inches. The reason for the large difference in 
calculated settlement between the finite element method and that used in 
the original settlement calculation is in the magnitude of stresses 
calculated by the two computer programs. 
The following scenario is envisioned as a 
events leading to ultimate collapse of the 
possible explanation of 
structure. Design and 
construction were basically in accordance with conventional national 
standards. During construction phases or soon thereafter, settlements 
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exceeding those anticipated occurred. The structure and adjacent 
embankments may all have settled. Exact settlement 
reliable permanent bench mark) data were not supplied. 
(referenced to a 
The magnitude of 
settlements, measured and reported by separate agencies on different 
dates, varies. 
Differential settlement may impose forces upon the structure for 
which it was not designed to accommodate. 
of distress that may have been taking 
Transformations and/or signs 
place longitudinally escaped 
detection -- ballast covered the invert sections and upper plates and 
bolts were beyond the range of normal vision for detecting defects. 
Initial distress was observed within that portion of the structure 
under the eastbound lanes. Embankment height above the top of the 
structure at that location was in the order of 10 feet. It was reported 
that the majority of heavily loaded trucks travelled the eastbound 
lanes. Many trucks returned unloaded in the westbound lanes. 
Gross vehicle weights of 150,000 pounds are reported as being 
frequent occurrences --some are reported as being 170,000 pounds. Rear 
triaxle loads for six-axle vehicles having gross loads of 150,000 and 
170,000 pounds would be in the order of 82,800 and 94,800 pounds, 
respectively. 
cited gross 
Rear dual-axle loads for five-axle vehicles having the 
loads would be approximately 69,000 and 79,000, 
respectively. There is a vast difference in those loads and that 
expected for the HS 20-44 (32 ,000 pounds on one rear axle) loading 
condition. Pavement deformities (dip) magnify the effect of live loads 
through impact. Live loads and impact loads above the structure along 
with railway loads (ballast, track, engine, cars) within the structure 
could foreseeably have been sufficient to cause distress within that 
portion under the eastbound lanes. 
The eastbound lanes were closed to traffic, one-way two-directional 
traffic was effected within the westbound lanes, and work commenced on 
unloading the structure under the eastbound lanes. For the westbound 
lanes, there was approximately a 2 .5-foot fill above the top of the 
structure. Live loading is more significant for shallow fills than for 
deeper fills. Removal of the soil envelope, or portions thereof, voided 
the metal structure-soil interaction. 
The effects of removal of the soil overburden (eastbound lanes) upon 
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the metal structure-soil interaction where materials remain in place 
(westbound lanes) are highly speculative. Areas were created where 
water could pond for long times as evidenced by the presence of 
cattails. Water may have seeped into and through the remaining soil 
envelope and weakened the composite structure. 
There are other plausible scenarios. Differential settlement 
between the structure and adjoining soil prisms could have transferred 
additional dead loads to be supported by the structure. Some designs 
strive to insure a reverse of that situation -- conditions are created 
to transfer a portion of the dead load weight from above the structure 
to the adjoining soil prisms That methodology is often referred to as 
the imperfect trench condition and is applicable to rigid underground 
conduit but not flexible conduit. 
Post construction documents indicate Department of Highways 
personnel made extensive efforts to determine the cause(s) of distress, 
monitor the situation, and ensure that precautionary measures were 
implemented. Frequent inspections were made during much of 1985 and 
until March 6, 1986. After March 6, a 24-hour watch was effected at the 
site. Transportation Cabinet officials took immediate actions in 
development of remedial plans. 
in an unusual and difficult 
Sound engineering judgment was exercised 
situation. Activities undertaken by 
Department of Highways' engineers in analyses, structural monitoring, 
and traffic control procedures were all conducted in a professional 
manner and in accordance with prudent engineering principles. The 
eastbound lanes were eventually closed and all traffic was routed to the 
westbound lanes. Closure of the eastbound lanes was prudent since 
traffic volumes were sufficiently low that diversion of eastbound 
traffic to one westbound lane would not create delays or backups. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are based upon discoveries made during 
the course of the investigation reported. 
Portions of specifications relevant to requirements for soils or 
soil-aggregate mixtures should be redrafted. Those specifications 
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should be worded to insure that soils or soil-aggregate mixtures, after 
placement and compaction, classify as being one of those currently 
required prior to placement. Material placed within the envelope for 
the KY 80 structure was probably relatively soft and particles broke 
during compaction. Harder materials could be specified to minimize 
particle breakage during compaction as well as deterioration due to 
weathering over a long period. 
The Department of Highways' provisions for materials that may be 
used for backfill (soil envelope) appear most suitable. Materials 
specified would not degrade under normal placement or compactive 
efforts. It appears that materials placed as backfill for the KY-80 
structure did not conform to those designated in Departmental 
provisions. It is recommended that materials meeting Departmental 
requirements for backfill be used for future construction. 
AASHTO officials should be solicited and requested to develop 
guidelines relative to design considerations for internal loadings for 
conduit. Some design texts contain design guides for buoyant forces and 
dead loads resulting from water within structures. Those officials also 
should be requested to provide rational guidelines relative to either 
consideration of longitudinal beam action or the establishment of 
limiting differential settlements permissible to insure that beam action 
could not be a failing mode. 
ADDENDUM 
After a draft of the major portion of this report was submitted for 
review, additional documents relating to events during construction and 
soon thereafter were delivered to the KTRP. Information contained in 
those documents was considered to be significantly important to prepare 
this Addendum and to suggest an additional scenario. Following are a 
synopsis of additional information received and a scenario that presents 
other possible causes for the ultimate collapse of the long-span 
structure. 
On November 17, 1986, the following were received from BMI: 
1) initial inspection reports, 
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2) elevation measurements made on hooks at various times 
during installation, 
3) computer run on MULTSPAN computer program utilizing 
readings from early 1986, and 
4) results of classification tests on soil obtained at the 
site on October 28, 1986. 
The computer-run sheets were based upon field data obtained March 6, 
1986. The Findings and Recommendations sheet contained an entry under 
type of deformation "Case 1 - Symmetrical flattening of crown." One 
recommendation was as follows: "Pipe deformations are critical - at 
least one top midordinate deflection is out 30% - close road and do a 
detailed evaluation, including soil borings to estimate any additional 
movement and determine needed remedial measures." In response to those 
recommendations, the eastbound lanes were closed, the Division of 
Materials performed materials explorations, and development of plans for 
remedial actions were initiated. 
Laboratory Report No. 808124 dated July 28, 1980, contained a 
discussion under Section I wherein it was stated that the fill was 
placed in accordance with specifications as modified and approved by 
Armco. It also was stated that no problems, which would affect this 
structure due to the backfill operations, were observed. 
Section II of the laboratory report contained technician's daily 
reports. The 5-27-80 report noted the railroad tracks were to have been 
placed 3' 10" above the bottom of the span, but no measurements were 
observed being made. It could not be determined if the tracks were at 
the design elevation and the tracks could not be used as a reference 
point to determine the span rise. The Report of Density Determination 
Tests dated 5-17-80 indicated specifications for density as being 90 
percent. Percentage compaction from two tests were 98 and 96. 
The 5-28-80 report noted that Mr. Frank Miller, Mr. Lee Anderson, 
and Mr. Sam Green were notified that the backfill material may not be 
the same gradation as the material sampled in April 1980. The 
technician thought degradation of the shale might be due to compaction, 
blading, and tracking operations. 
A report indicating services for June 4, 5, 10, and 11, 1980, stated 
soils classified as A-2-4 after it had been placed and compacted (for 
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Wednesday, June 4, 1980). It was recommended that the backfill be 
compacted to 93 percent of the modified Proctor density at a moisture 
content no greater than three percent above optimum moisture. That was 
recommended to reduce degradation of the shale. The recommendation was 
approved by Mr. Miller and Mr. Green. Six percentage compactions 
reported 6-4-80 were 89, 92, 90, 91, 96, and 93, with 93 being listed as 
required by specifications. Retests 1A and 2A were reported as 90 and 
91 percent of maximum dry density after recompaction. 
On 6-5-80, the percentage compacted ranged from 89 to 96; the range 
was 90 to 98 according to reports for 6-10-80. 
D. A. Ream's June 17, 1980, letter to F. Miller noted that fresh and 
reworked shale sampled May 28, 1980, classified as A-4 and out of Armco 
and KDOT project specifications. 
1980, after being compacted and 
Shale was sampled again on May 30, 
the soil type then was A-2-4. 
Unconfined compressive tests made on the second set of samples showed 
the material to have approximately 4,000 psf bearing capacity when 
compacted to 93 percent of the maximum density established by the 
modified Proctor tests. It was opinioned that the soil was suitable for 
use around the Super Span and recommended that the moisture content 
should not be greater than three percent above optimum moisture when 
placed. 
The June 20, 1980, report stated that measurements were made with 
all fill in place to determine if additional fill would have any effect 
on the span. No unusual movement was noted, except for a slight 
movement downward. All movements were well within specifications. 
On November 18, 1986, FMSM and HAl personnel delivered to KTRP 
cross-section sheets containing field measurements obtained November 6, 
1980. One sheet depicts design and actual crown elevations and contains 
a notation-- Max. Error (-1.84'). That same sheet depicts design and 
actual rail elevations with the notation-- Max. Error (-0.48'). Cross-
sectional dimensions are depicted on one sheet for Stations 50 + 97 to 
51+ 37. Design, tolerance, and actual dimensions are shown. 
At Station 51 + 12, it appears the structure moved outward 
approximately 1.25 feet from the design position to the left of 
centerline and inward 0.15 foot to the right of centerline. At Station 
50+ 97, indications are the structure was 0.98 foot outward of design 
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on the left of centerline and 0.68 foot inward of design on the right of 
centerline. Actual sections were depicted as being within tolerances 
between Stations 51+ 30 and 51+ 37. Between Stations 51+ 21.5 and 51 
+ 30, the structure was shown to have moved outward of tolerance both 
right and left of centerline. 
AASHTO specifications for both design and construction guidelines 
stress the soil-metal plate structure interaction concept. Section 
1.9.10 Long-Span Structural Plate Structures of the 1977 AASHTO 
specifications designates use of A-1, A-3, A-2-4, or A-2-5 soils for the 
envelope when the height of fill is less than 12 feet. Material 
reportedly met classification requirements prior to placement and 
compaction and later degraded during compaction, blading, and tracking 
operations; further degradation of the shaley backfill may have resulted 
from weathering. Properties of the in-place soil may have been 
unsuitable for the necessary soil-metal plate structure interaction. 
Finer-grained soils do not drain readily and are ordinarily more 
plastic than coarser-grained soils. Fine-grained soils may have very 
low bearing values when their moisture content is appreciably above 
optimum. The shale may have been subjected to excess moisture and 
consequent softening and may have decreased the effectiveness of the 
soil-metal plate structure interaction. 
A decrease or 
reason, may lead 
structure. 
loss of passive resistance 
to distress and eventual 
pressure, for whatever 
collapse of the metal 
